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RUNNING HEAD: Art expertise in construing the meaning of paintings 
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Abstract 
Aesthetic appraisal of artwork can present the observer with visual problems to solve in the 
process of grasping of its meaning and ‘visual rightness’ (i.e. “good” structure; Locher, 2003), 
with an elaboration on perceptual, semantic and affective dimensions (e.g. Marković, 2011). 
Thus observer’s expertise is a factor in aesthetic appraisal. To examine the influence of art 
training on the aesthetic response, and to clarify the nature of the Representational / Abstract 
distinction, 30 Experts and 33 Non-experts (Art and Psychology students, respectively) were 
asked to rate 24 paintings on six affective and affective-evaluative semantic differential scales. 
Stimuli were images of paintings from the period 1900-1935, 12 broadly Representational and 
12 broadly Abstract. Relative to Non-experts, Experts rated Abstract artworks as more 
Interesting, Beautiful, Informative and Sophisticated, distinguishing them less markedly from 
Representational artworks. Aggregate Expert and Non-expert ratings, processed by factor 
analysis, resulted in a two-factor solution. The first factor, contrasting Abstract and 
Representational artworks, appeared more salient for Non-experts. The second factor, Cool–
Warm, separating vibrantly-colored paintings from those with a blue-dominated/dull palette, 
was more salient for Experts. While Non-experts exaggerated differences between Abstract and 
Representational paintings, Experts appraised these two types of art similarly, attending more 
to artwork collative properties. We conclude that appreciation of art by Experts involves 
‘cognitive mastery’ (Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004), i.e. more complex, cues-based 
visual schemata which equip them with more sophisticated strategies for analysing collative 
properties and semantics of an artwork while parsing ‘visual rightness’ to unfold its visual 
meaning. 
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Suppose there was some great God of Aesthetics. And then whenever you made a 
painting, no matter how much you liked it, … you would submit it to the great God of 
Aesthetics and the God would say, “This is good,” or, “This is bad.” After a while the 
problem is for you to develop an aesthetic sense that fits with the thing, not just your own 
personal feelings about it. 
 
Richard Feynman, in: L. Mlodinow, Feynman’s Rainbow. A Search for Beauty in 
Physics and Life (2011, p. 131) 
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1. Introduction 
Two individuals may differ in their personal tastes, perhaps preferring different degrees of 
complexity or novelty. But independently of that, observers often disagree on the qualities they 
extract from an artwork to compare against those ideals – that is, they vary in how they appraise 
the artwork, ascribing it different values on a scale such as ‘simple/complex’, or different 
degrees of similarity to a second artwork. These variations invite an examination of the 
processes involved in art appraisal. A particular focus of the present study is the elusive concept 
of “art expertise”, one conspicuous form of individual variation. A second focus is the concept 
of “Abstraction”, which is in contrast a quality that varies between artworks. This Introduction 
integrates various studies on these two concepts, how they interact and where they might fit in 
a ‘Unified Theory of Aesthetic Response’. We also sketch some of the methods available for 
quantifying aesthetic responses, to provide a certain context and justification for the questions 
addressed here. 
 
1.1. Multi-stage models of aesthetic experience as frameworks for art expertise 
Numerous studies have examined changes in observers’ performance resulting from art training 
and “expertise”. These changes manifest in visual search strategies (Nodine, Locher, & 
Krupinski, 1993; Pihko et al., 2011), with greater attention to abstract features and structural 
relations between depicted objects (Vogt & Magnussen, 2007). Art experts also differ from 
novices in their projective test responses (Bilotta & Lindauer, 1980); strategies for sorting 
artworks by similarity (Augustin & Leder, 2006; Frechtling & Davidson, 1970); and ratings on 
scales of complexity, novelty, pleasingness (Stojilović & Marković, 2014), etc. 
Collectively, these findings point out that compared to laypersons, art experts follow 
qualitatively different schemata of artwork aesthetics, focusing on non-denotative sensory 
qualities and higher-order semantic properties of artworks. 
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Multi-stage models of aesthetic response are especially relevant for present purposes 
(reviewed by Pelowski, Markey, Lauring, & Leder, 2016). Among these, Leder, Belke, 
Oeberst, and Augustin’s model (2004; also Leder & Nadal, 2014) is couched in terms of 
information processing. In its latest elaboration, the Vienna Integrated Model in Art Perception 
(VIMAP; Pelowski, Markey, Forster, Gerger, & Leder, 2017), aesthetic experience is 
conceived as a cognitive process that starts with analysis of low-level features (color, 
luminance, contrast etc.) and progresses to higher-level processing by involving interpretations 
of the artwork. 
The stages of sophistication of aesthetic appraisal are explicitly developmental (see also 
Parsons, 1987). Crucially, multi-stage models allow for individuals to differ in which stage of 
processing is dominant, or which level of visual complexity they prefer, on a scale from low-
information simplicity to random unpredictability. Aesthetic experience progression unfolds 
from naïve, single-perspective hedonic (‘liking’) responses to highly conceptualized 
evaluations of the image as a cultural artifact (‘cognitive mastery’). At the ‘liking’ stage, the 
art stimulus is observed in a conceptual vacuum, while in ‘cognitive mastery’ it is embedded 
in a context as part of a cultural dialog embracing historical meaning and artistic factors of the 
artwork, then judged on these additional terms. Augustin and Leder (2006, p. 136) go on to 
argue that “the ‘outcome’ of any aesthetic episode in the sense of pleasure, displeasure or any 
kind of judgment of an artwork cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the stimulus 
aspects and the cognitive concepts that were relevant during the processing and interpretation.” 
Along the developmental pathway to cognitive mastery, individuals differ in their 
preferred level of artwork complexity. As formulated by Silvia (2013), complexity and novelty 
in an artwork distinguish experts from novices by evoking a positive value of ‘coping potential’ 
from the former and a negative value from the latter; ‘complexity’ combines with these to 
produce the ‘knowledge emotions’ of Interest or Confusion, respectively. 
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A complex or ambiguous image (e.g. a pattern of irregular blotches on a contrasting 
background) requires the observer to marshal cognitive resources. If the ambiguity is then 
resolved in a delayed closure, filling in missing details to reveal a simple reinterpretation, then 
those resources are released again and aesthetic satisfaction follows. In the words of Belke. 
Leder, and Augustin (2006, p. 116), “the experience to dissolve perceptual or conceptual 
ambiguity is assumed to influence the continuous affective evaluation of an artwork 
positively”. In their multi-stage information-processing model, this occurs at the intermediate 
stage of ‘explicit classification’ where an artwork is categorized – encoding unique artist’s style 
and the content’s historical/contextual meaning. In a dialectic between bottom-up intrinsic 
perceptual variables and top-down acquired knowledge, visual complexity of an artwork is 
reduced to schematic, propositional form (Lindell & Mueller, 2011; Pelowski et al., 2017). 
 
1.2. Abstraction 
As foreshadowed above, there is an interaction between observer expertise and each artwork’s 
level of abstraction. It is widely reported that naïve and expert observers tend to agree in their 
assessments of Representational art; assessments of Abstract artworks are where they diverge 
(e.g. Leder, Gerger, Brieber, & Schwarz, 2014; Leder, Gerger, Dressler, & Schabmann, 2012; 
Mullennix & Robinet, 2018; Pihko et al., 2011). Artists (or at least art students) attend to ‘style 
schemes’ in Abstract art to which non-artists (e.g. psychology students) are oblivious (Cela-
Conde, Marty, Munar, Nadal, & Burges, 2002). 
Hekkert and van Wieringen (1996) presented subjects with an array of post-
impressionist works and made the images more abstract by removing color and/or fine 
figurative detail; these manipulations had negative impact on aesthetic appraisal, which 
decreased with expertise (see also Neperud & Marschalek, 1988, for a similar interventional 
approach). This might even serve as an operational form of the Abstract/Representational 
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distinction: the more differently an image is processed by experts and non-experts, the higher 
its level of abstraction. 
In another intervention study, Locher (2003) displaced compositional elements in a 
range of art stimuli and asked subjects to recognize the original from the manipulated version. 
A breakdown of their stated rationales revealed that Abstract paintings tended to evoke a more 
cognitive level of consideration relative to the concrete, hedonic approach applied to 
Representational ones. This further illustrates the integral connection between the stages of 
aesthetic processing, and differences among art styles and types – in particular, the distinction 
between ‘Abstract’ and Representational types. 
As the name implies, the Abstract mode aspires to generality, progressively stripped of 
the litany of particulars (e.g. recognizable “thingness”: scenes, motifs, or persons). The absence 
forces the observer’s attention to focus on aspects such as line, palette, technique, composition, 
although all of these are also important aspects of Representational art. The rise of Abstract 
styles and movements is a relatively recent development in art history, and accompanies an 
opening separation between experts and naïve observers. We note that Marković (2011) and 
Leder et al. (2012) write about a Representational/Abstract dimension, or level of abstractness, 
while Pihko et al. (2011) recognize three intermediate categories between the two extremes. 
Although it is convenient to treat the distinction as a sharp dichotomy, it is more of a continuous 
gradient: even the most realistic, academic painting has elements of stylization and convention 
(Chatterjee, Widick, Sternschein, Smith II, & Bromberger, 2010). 
 
1.3. Experimental approaches for artwork appraisal 
In an influential paradigm of quantifying aesthetic experience the focus is on subjective 
similarities among images (Augustin & Leder, 2006). Observers’ ratings of pairwise similarity 
are summarized by converting them into a geometrical model or ‘map’, via multidimensional 
scaling (MDS; e.g. Avital & Cupchik, 1998; Berlyne, 1975; Berlyne & Ogilvie, 1974; Cupchik, 
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1974; Goude, 1972). In the context of art expertise, MDS provides individual-difference 
models that handle systematic observer variation (O’Hare & Gordon, 1977). The axes locating 
points within the spatial solution can tentatively be identified as attributes used to compare and 
contrast the images, each contributing to perceived dissimilarity, e.g. “Realistic–Unrealistic” 
and “Clear–Indefinite” (O’Hare, 1976). The task of eliciting similarities for all pairs for the 
MDS approach limits the number of paintings that can conveniently be sampled. This in turn 
limits the ranges of inter-stimulus variation that can be captured. 
In contrast, in the semantic-differential method stimuli are presented one at a time, 
asking subjects to rate each one on a battery of affective or evaluative scales, with scales 
defined by pairs of antonymous extremes. Thus it allows a richer stimulus set to be probed. 
The field has not reached consensus on the optimal number of scales, and which ones, 
to capture the observers’ appraisals. In his pioneering studies Berlyne (1976; Berlyne & 
Ogilvie, 1974) opted for 12 bipolar scales, such as Complexity, Familiarity, Unexpectedness, 
Regularity, describing collative (informational) properties of artworks, sampling their Valence 
(Hedonic tone), Arousal and Uncertainty. 
In the following years the number of employed scales varied substantially depending 
on the researchers’ theoretical framework. Hekkert and van Wieringen (1996) provided five 
scales for assessing monochrome images and two more for the colored versions. Van 
Paasschen, Bacci, and Melcher (2015) employed four scales that, according to their a priori 
paradigm, suffice to capture the high-level qualities of artworks: Beauty, Valence, Liking and 
Arousal. 
At the other extreme, Augustin, Carbon, and Wagemans (2011) started from first 
principles and tasked their subjects with a fine-grained pool of 77 unipolar scales, which they 
reduced to 23 in a second experiment. Marković and Radonjić (2008) elicited 25 and 43 
antonym pairs for quantifying ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ qualities, respectively. Marković (2011) 
developed these into 32 scales arranged in a typology of three domains: 12 perceptual-
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descriptive, 12 affective-aesthetic, and eight (unipolar) ‘semantic’ scales. These domains 
correspond loosely to the levels of information processing in the multi-stage models addressed 
above, from reductionist objective descriptors to abstract subjective evaluations, i.e. 
comparable to the bottom-up/top-down extremes in Lindell & Mueller (2011) and Pelowski et 
al. (2017). 
This level of detail may be unwarranted, though, and the exact choice of scales may not 
be crucial in studies of this kind. The presence of subtle distinctions among the pool of scales 
– e.g. between Beauty vs. Pleasingness (Valence) vs. Preference – is no guarantee that the 
subjects will use these niceties, or understand the analytical, philosophical refinements that the 
researchers intended. Indeed, Marković (2011) noted that a Representational/Abstract 
distinction could be discerned in each of his three parallel domains, implying an element of 
redundancy. 
 
1.4. Broader context: multifaceted nature of artwork appraisal 
The multifaceted nature of art appraisal is a recurring theme in the literature on experimental 
aesthetics. Paintings can provide visual pleasure by their color harmony, symmetry, simplicity, 
balanced composition (or perceptual goodness and closure, to borrow the terms of Gestalt 
Psychology), familiar motifs or ‘fluency of processing’ (Lindell & Mueller, 2011); in other 
cases, artwork complexity, novelty, intricacy, ambiguity or stimulation may afford more 
cerebral satisfaction (Muth, Hesslinger, & Carbon, 2015). 
Berlyne (1976; Berlyne & Ogilvie, 1974) grouped the collative properties of artworks 
under the rubrics of Valence (Hedonic tone), Arousal and Uncertainty: three factors of 
subjective response inspired by Osgood’s Evaluation, Potency and Activity (EPA) scheme (cf. 
Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). The Valence/Hedonic tone factor also emerged from a number 
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of analyses (e.g. Neperud, 1970), loading on scales such as “UglyBeautiful” or 
“UnpleasantPleasant”, that capture the accessible ‘liking’ aspects of appraisal. 
The other two factors identified by Berlyne (counterparts of Osgood’s Potency and 
Activity) are recurring too: Arousal (unexpectedness, unbalance, stimulation) and Uncertainty 
(complexity, ambiguity) – “the extent to which a stimulus pattern (an art object, for instance) 
calls for information processing on the part of the viewer” (Alluisi, 1975, p. 520). Stojilović 
and Marković (2014) recently arrived at a second-order factor of General Aesthetic Experience, 
but this subsumed three first-order factors, Arousal, Aesthetic Experience, and Relaxation 
Tone. 
As discussed above (1.1), experts appear to differ from naïve observers in having access 
to additional frames of reference for interpreting and grasping the underlying simplicity within 
a novel work. Van Paasschen et al. (2015) recently reported that experts scored stimuli more 
highly than novices on an Aesthetic scale (Beauty) without differing on an Affective scale 
(Valence), as if their training allowed the experts to see beauty invisible to novices and separate 
from Hedonic tone. Mullennix and Robinet (2018), indeed, found that novices and experts did 
not differ in their ‘liking’ but expertise was positively correlated with ‘understanding’ 
judgments. Thus, in line with the ‘cognitive mastery’ stage of the multi-stage model (Pelowski 
et al., 2017), ‘expertise’ might be rephrased as ‘possession of multiple schemata’. Specifically, 
art-trained viewers possess “more elaborate and complex categorizations of art” (Neperud, 
1988, p. 293), which enable them to actively process the information available in artworks to 
make sense of them, or exercising the ‘coping potential’ (Silvia, 2013), resulting in deeper 
aesthetic experiences. It follows that the optimal level of complexity – enough to call upon 
cognitive resources, but not enough to obscure the ambiguity completely – is training-
dependent. 
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1.5. Hypotheses 
In the present study, we compared appraisal of artworks by university Art students (‘Experts’) 
and Psychology students (‘Non-experts’). We anticipated that an important aspect of art 
expertise is the possession of multiple frameworks or schemata for ‘explicit classification’, 
leading to an increase in comprehension of artworks and, hence, their aesthetic appreciation 
(Pelowski et al., 2017), by resolving their ambiguities and recognizing ‘visual rightness’ 
(Locher, 2003). We hypothesized that art Experts will (1) reveal more elaborate judgments of 
evaluative-affective meaning of artworks compared to Non-experts, who will focus on simpler 
criteria to dominate their judgments [Expertise]; (2) vary more among themselves than Non-
experts do, especially in their appraisal of Abstract artworks; and (3) construe the meaning of 
Abstract works more positively than Non-experts, who will judge Representational artworks 
higher than Abstract ones [Artwork Type]. 
For stimuli we selected 24 paintings, from a period in the early 20th century, to avoid 
diachronic forms of variation. Artwork appraisal was assessed using six semantic differential 
scales. In effect, for each of N observers the stimuli were located as a point within a six-
dimensional space; collectively, observers’ responses located each stimulus in 6 x N 
dimensions. The goal of analysis was to reduce the data to a parsimonious account, taking 
advantage of any interdependence and redundancy among the scales to fit them and the points 
into a lower-dimensional space, while exploring differences in the spaces of art Experts vs. 
Non-experts. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Sixty-three participants were recruited at a North-West England university; all were 1st, 2nd, 
3rd-year students or undertook internship shortly after graduation. Fine Arts students (N=30; 5 
males), Experts (Es), were recruited as volunteers through opportunity sampling; they were 
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aged 19-52, with mean age 22.9  6.0 years. Psychology students (N=34), Non-experts (NEs), 
were recruited through opportunity sampling, apart from 1st-year Psychology students who 
received course credits for their participation. Data of one Psychology student, a 55-year old 
male, had to be removed from the analysis since the instruction was apparently misunderstood 
– see below. In the final sample (N=33; 9 males), age ranged between 18-40 years, with mean 
age of 22.3  5.7 years. Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the 
Department of Psychology. All participants gave their informed consent prior to participation 
in the study. 
 
2.2. Stimuli 
Twenty-four artworks were selected from the period 1900-1935, 12 Representational (R) and 
12 Abstract (A) (see Table 1 for the list of artists and paintings). This time window was intended 
to capture the period in International Modernism when the concept of ‘abstraction’ emerged as 
an autonomous category (Greenberg, 1960). The Representational artworks were chosen in 
line with the definition of depicting objects, scenes or events known by the viewer; conversely, 
the Abstract artworks were defined as those that do not depict literal objects encountered in the 
physical world. 
------------------------------------ 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
To reduce confounding factors and focus on the role of Artwork Type, where possible, 
pairs of stimuli were loosely matched between the two types by subject matter: e.g. Paul Klee’s 
Senicio (1922), an A painting of a face, was matched with the Portrait of Anna Akhmatova 
(1922), R painting by Kuzma Petrov-Vodkin. When the subject matter of an A artwork was not 
recognizable, a R counterpart was chosen on the basis of similar color palette or composition. 
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All images were of high resolution. They were presented on a computer monitor (13.3 
in) as singletons (approximately 413px x 536px), centered (in an area of 75% x 75% of total 
screen size), on a gray background (RGB values 191,191,191). 
 
2.3. Instruments 
To assess responses to the paintings, we chose six semantic differential scales (SDs), guided 
by previous studies in empirical aesthetics that employed SD as the tool (Berlyne & Ogilvie, 
1974; Biaggio & Supplee, 1983; Marković, 2011; Neperud & Jenkins, 1982; Silvia, 2006). 
These were 7-point scales, anchored at each extreme with antonymous adjectives (cf. Osgood 
et al., 1975). In the terminology of these previous studies, the scales were as follows: 
1. SD1: BoringInteresting 
2. SD2: UglyBeautiful 
3. SD3: AnnoyingPleasing 
4. SD4: UninformativeInformative 
5. SD5: CoolWarm 
6. SD6: NaïveSophisticated 
 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants viewed single images presented in a pseudorandom sequence. As each image 
appeared, it was accompanied by a first SD scale, presented beneath the image, where it 
remained until a response was made by pressing a key 1 to 7 on the computer keyboard. The 
response was saved and the next scale was presented (in pseudorandom order within each trial). 
After the sixth scale, the image was replaced by a blank grey screen for 2000 ms before the 
next stimulus appeared, to minimize the possibility of imposing an afterimage upon the latter. 
This procedure was repeated until all 24 images had been rated, a process that took less than 
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an hour in total. E-Prime 2.0 software was used for presenting the stimulus sequence and 
recording the responses. The experiment proper was preceded by a practice trial, including one 
R (Southall, Belgium Supported by Hope, 1918) and one A artwork (Bomberg, The mud bath, 
1914), not part of the main stimulus set, to familiarize the participant with the task. 
The experiment took place in a quiet room on the university campus, one student at a 
time, with only the researcher present. The room provided ambient daylight through a window; 
the participant faced the window, from which the monitor was shielded, and was seated ca. 30 
cm from the monitor. 
 
2.5. Data analysis 
A natural approach with rating data is to apply Factor Analysis (FA) to reduce them to an 
underlying structure. However, the three-mode nature of the present data (subjects by stimuli 
by scales) pose an analytic challenge. Algorithms do exist for factorizing three-mode data sets, 
and have been applied in the art-aesthetic context (Kroonenberg, 1983; Neperud, 1970), but 
the results are not straightforward to interpret, and are fraught with rotational indeterminacy. 
Studies (e.g. Berlyne & Ogilvie, 1974) sometimes postulate that variance within a 
defined subject sub-group can be ignored and removed (by averaging the ratings for each 
stimulus/scale combination) prior to conventional FA. This is far from rigorous, and imposes 
the very structure that we are testing for. By way of counter-argument, it is conceivable that a 
novice and an expert might differ in how they understand and apply (for instance) the 
‘Sophistication’ scale, depending on what they bring to the art encounter. In other words, the 
scale in question might probe two different concepts (quite apart from different appraisals of 
the images themselves). But it is also possible for experts to differ among themselves. Finally, 
it is not obvious that novices or experts are themselves a homogeneous subgroup, with all 
subjects at a given stage of aesthetic development interpreting and grouping the scales 
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identically. (Few of the Art students would have reached high mastery level, while some of the 
Psychology students may have acquired some art expertise independently.) 
Instead, to explore Expert vs. Non-expert difference, we first applied FA to data 
arranged in the “stringing-out” technique, used by Osgood et al. (1975) to simplify the variance 
among the scales (cf. also Marković & Radonjić, 2008); here, though, it was used to reduce the 
variance among the subjects into their factor loadings. A second level of FA, targeting the 
resulting factors themselves, clarified the factors’ structures of SD scales. Then we repeated 
the process of stringing-out FA, focusing on the variance among the paintings to allow differing 
appraisal of the two Artwork Types to emerge. 
As mentioned above, data of one participant were excluded from the analyses since he 
appeared to have rated each painting identically on all six scales, e.g. scoring the Braque at 1, 
Lempicka at 7, and so on. 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Factor analysis: expert and non-expert artwork spaces 
Normally we would begin with a basic description of the data, reporting mean values and 
trends, before progressing to analysis of the internal structure. Here we reluctantly reverse 
that sequence. Our goal is to avoid averaging responses across any variable without first 
examining the variation on that variable to test whether there is sufficient consensus (across 
subjects, or scales). We also want to be able to justify grouping subjects by Expertise, or 
paintings by Artwork Type, and not to simply assume that they are distinct groups. 
 
3.1.1. Simplifying subject variance 
With three-way data, dimension reduction to a simpler form must go through several stages. 
We arranged the data as a table with the 63 subjects as columns, and each of the 6 (scales) x 
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24 (paintings) = 144 painting-scale combinations as a row, before applying FA in its simplest 
form (Principal Components Analysis, PCA). Each of the resulting Principal Components 
(PCs) is a ‘prototypal subject’, i.e. a prototype pattern of responses to all paintings on all scales, 
and the responses from each actual subject are approximated by a combination of the PCs, 
weighted by his or her loadings on them. 
The first three PCs accounted for 28.33%, 5.71% and 4.29% of total variance, with 
eigenvalues of 17.85, 3.60 and 2.70, respectively. Thus the first component (PC1) dominates 
the variance, and we begin by focusing on it, treating it as an area of agreement or consensus 
pattern of responses shared across Es and NEs; in contrast, the second and subsequent 
components capture minor deviations from or modulations of this consensus. 
Individual subjects’ loadings on PC1 (“Consensus”) – how closely they approach the 
prototypal observer – are almost all positive, with a mean of 0.49; crucially, these loadings 
differ significantly with expertise (plotted in Fig. 1). Mean loadings for PC1 are 0.41 ( SE 
0.04) for Es and 0.57 ( SE 0.03) for NEs (p = 0.002). Loadings on PC2 also differ 
(“Distinction”; see Fig. 1): the E and NE groups have positive and negative mean PC2 values, 
respectively, with means 0.10 (0.04) for Es and 0.05 (0.04) for NEs (p = 0.010). On PC3, 
means were 0.08 (0.03) and 0.05 (0.04), respectively (p = 0.017). The between-group 
differences are a major mode of variation among the subjects, justifying the separate treatment 
of Es and NEs. In addition, as shown by dispersion of the points in Fig. 1, Es seem to vary more 
among themselves, and deviate further from PC1 (the overall dominant pattern of responses) 
than NEs. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
PCA provides the option of recovering the underlying PCs themselves as part of its 
output, as columns of 144 scores. Recall that each PC is a prototypal pattern of responses to 
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individual paintings. For the analysis of Artwork Type, we restructured PC1 into a 24-by-6 
table, with paintings as rows and scales as columns. It was then possible to apply PCA a second 
time, focusing on the paintings and simplifying the variance among the scales. (If we had 
obtained a table directly by averaging the score for each painting and scale across subjects, this 
would be the first application of PCA.) In this second-order solution, scores on the first 
component PC1(2) arranged the paintings along an A-to-R axis, although it is not a perfect split: 
within each Artwork Type, the paintings vary in the degree of appraised abstraction 
(Supplementary Fig. S1). Scores on the second-order PC2(2) indicate a quality of color, 
contrasting warm palettes with the cool blue palettes of paintings; we term PC2(2) 
‘Color/Warmth/Vibrancy’. Looking at the scales themselves, SD5 CoolWarm loads highly on 
PC2(2), while the other five scales, used with little distinction between them, load highly on 
PC1(2). 
Having established a group difference for Expertise, it is possible to use PCA to isolate 
and exaggerate the differences between the E and NE groups. This entails rotating the solution 
to simple structure, where the rotated factors correspond to prototypal E and NE response 
patterns, and restructuring each factor for second-order PCA as described in the previous 
paragraph. Fig. S2 shows the outcome. Notably, a simple A/R split dominates the exaggerated 
NE prototype. In the E prototype, the corresponding component is more nuanced, while the 
‘Color/Warmth/Vibrancy’ feature becomes evident (Hypothesis 1). 
However, it is more intuitive to repeat the whole procedure for the two groups 
separately, which delivers reassuringly similar results. In the solution for the 30 Es in isolation, 
the first three unrotated PCs had eigenvalues (VAF) of 7.20 (24.01%), 2.11 (7.04%) and 1.90 
(6.32%). All but one PC1 loading were positive, with a mean loading of 0.44. In the solution 
for 33 NEs in isolation, the first three PCs have eigenvalues (VAF) of 11.87 (33.96%), 2.08 
(6.31%), 1.86 (5.62%). All PC1 loadings were positive, with a mean loading of 0.58. For each 
group, the consensus is a weighted mean of responses from individual subjects (weighted by 
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reliability, i.e. how closely they approximated the group’s collective opinion). These numbers 
indicate an E-specific and a NE-specific consensus. As expected (Hypothesis 2), untrained 
subjects reveal greater within-group agreement, while Experts deviate more among themselves 
from their group consensus. 
As before, we rearranged the E-only PC1 and NE-only PC1 into 24-by-6 painting-by-
scale tables. For convenience of comparison and display, we stacked these into a 48-by-6 table 
in which each painting appears twice: once as a row describing how Es characterized it on the 
6 scales, and then as a second row for the NE description. 
PCA resulted in a two-component solution with eigenvalues (VAF) of 4.10 (68.40%), 
0.99 (16.49%). The second component (PC2) is still identifiable as Color or Warmth or 
Vibrancy, and is dominated by SD5, while the first component (PC1), Abstract-
Representational, combines the other five SD scales. Scores for the paintings are plotted as 
Fig. 2 with lines connecting the dual perceptions of each one. (Fig. S1 is effectively the same 
solution, but does not show the expertise-related differences.) 
------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
There is a notable trend in Fig. 2 for the NEs’ appraisal, compared to their E 
counterparts, to be more polarized, manifested by displacing points for Abstract paintings 
further to the left and for Representational paintings further to the right. In other words, the 
Non-experts used the scales to distinguish A from R paintings more clearly. This can be seen 
in the mean PC1 values for the 12 A and 12 R works, which are 0.67 and 0.59, respectively in 
the NE responses, whereas the corresponding means in the E responses are 0.27 and 0.36. 
We note in addition that the dispersal along PC1 (i.e. the variance of scores) is greater 
for the NE appraisal of the paintings than for the E perceptions: 1.30 and 0.74, respectively. 
Conversely, the dispersal along PC2, Color/Warmth/Vibrancy, is greater for the E perceptions 
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than for the NEs – 1.26 and 0.71, respectively. That is, NEs place relatively more weight on 
PC1, Artwork Type, when rating the paintings, and less on PC2, their palette. 
 
3.1.2. Simplifying stimulus variance 
It is also instructive to apply PCA to a reorganized table where paintings are the columns and 
the 6 (scales) x 63 (subjects) = 378 combinations are rows. This simplifies the painting variance 
first, reducing the responses to descriptions of a convenient number of ‘prototypal paintings’. 
The first four PCs had eigenvalues (variance) of 5.28 (21.98%), 2.43 (10.13%), 1.72 
(7.18%) and 1.44 (6.01%), declining slowly in magnitude after the third. Guided by the scree 
test, we retained the first three PCs. After Varimax rotation to simple structure, the artworks 
were described by the factor loadings plotted in Fig. 3. The solution distinguishes between R 
works, with dominant PC1 loadings, and A works, closer to PC2. One can speak of PC1 and 
PC2 being Representational and Abstract prototypes, while PC3 could be described as a 
prototype of Color or Vibrancy, or stylized Representational, best approximated by Dix, 
Gauguin, Hopper and Roerich works (the paintings with highest PC3 loading). That is to say, 
observers’ responses did implicitly distinguish the types of painting. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
3.2. Semantic differential scales: subject means, averaged by artwork type 
Having established that the E and NE groups do differ in their responses, and also that R and 
A paintings do collectively differ, we finally return to our Hypothesis 1, with a more detailed 
examination of the broad, descriptive properties of the data. 
For each SD scale, two sets of contrasting mean scores were calculated: for each subject 
i, means mR(i,s) and mA(i,s) for the two Artwork Types (i.e. across 12 R and 12 A paintings, 
separately); and for each painting p, means mE(p,s) and mNE(p,s) for the two Expertise subject 
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groups (i.e. across 30 Es and 33 NEs). These contrasts are summarized in Figs. 4 and 5 as 
scatterplots. Fig. 4 emphasizes variation specific to the Artwork Type, where each panel 
contains a point for each subject, located by mA(i,s) and mR(i,s) as x- (Abstract) and y- 
(Representational) axis coordinates, respectively. In comparison, Fig. 5 emphasizes variation 
of responses related to art Expertise, and each panel contains a point for each painting, located 
by its mE(p,s) and mNE(p,s) values as the x- (Expert) and y- (Non-expert) axes. (Fig. S3 of 
Supplementary Materials displays mE(p,s) and mNE(p,s) in the form of bar graphs.) The two 
distributions of points in each panel are summarized by 70% confidence-region ellipses 
(Friendly, 2006), fitted in Fig. 4 to E and NE subjects (red and blue, respectively), and in Fig. 
5 to R and A paintings (green and red, respectively). 
------------------------------------ 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Finally, Fig. 6 shows the overall mean response on each scale, within Artwork Type and 
subject Expertise. That is, for each s, the means of mR(i,s) and mA(i,s), averaged separately for 
Es and NEs; or conversely, the means of mE(p,s) and mNE(p,s), averaged separately for A and 
R stimuli. 
Combined, Figs. 4 and 6 (and Fig. S3) indicate that E and NE participants gave more 
positive scores to R than to A artworks, so the totality of points tend to lie above the diagonals 
in Fig. 4. In 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Artwork Type as the within-subjects factor contrasting 
mR(i,s) and mA(i,s) and Expertise as the between-subjects factor, this emerged as a significant 
main effect of the Artwork Type for all scales (marginal for SD1) (see Table 2 and Fig. 6). 
------------------------------------ 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Notably, much of these overall R/A differences were specific to the NE group. That is, 
the distribution of NEs was further above the diagonal in each panel of Fig. 4, while the E 
distribution overlapped it. Measuring the difference between the ellipses, the Artwork 
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TypeExpertise interaction effect reached significance for all scales (marginal for SD2), i.e. 
the tendency of R to elicit more positive responses than A paintings was higher for NEs. The 
interaction effect accords with previous findings that artistic training results in higher 
Pleasingness ratings for Abstract artworks (Leder et al., 2012; Stojilović & Marković, 2014). 
Although individual Es varied in their use of a given scale, they tended to be 
consistently biased: if an E’s mean rating across A paintings lay at one or other extreme of a 
scale, he or she tended to rate R paintings equally high or low, resulting in ellipses that are 
elongated and aligned with the diagonal (e.g. SD2, UglyBeautiful). SD4, 
UninformativeInformative, evoked most variation from Es and NEs alike, and the largest 
distributions. At the other extreme, SD5, CoolWarm, showed least variation and the smallest 
ellipses (despite the elongation of the Es’ ellipse). 
NEs were not so even-handed. Their ellipses are typically tilted at a < 45° angle, almost 
horizontal for SD2 and SD6. This is due to their mA(i,s) means varying across a wider range 
than their mR(i,s) means: the latter tend to be confined to the upper end of the scale, with the 
exception of SD5. However, for R and A paintings combined, neither Es nor NEs gave more 
positive scores than the other (which would have separated their ellipses along the diagonal). 
That is, there were no significant main effects of Expertise for any scale. 
------------------------------------ 
Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.3. Semantic differential scales: artwork means, averaged by expertise 
Turning to the aggregate scores for each painting within the E and NE groups, there are 
consistent displacements between the two ellipses in each panel of Fig. 5. R paintings received 
more positive scores from NEs than from Es, displacing the corresponding ellipse above the 
diagonal (see SD1, SD5); conversely, A paintings received more positive scores from Es than 
from NEs, shifting their ellipse below the diagonal (most obvious for SD4, but also SD2, SD6), 
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or both (SD3). That is to say, the NE ratings (y-axes) tend to separate R from A artworks more 
clearly, with NEs rating R artworks as more Interesting, Pleasing and Sophisticated than Es (x-
axes). In 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Expertise as a within-painting measure contrasting 
mNE(p,s) and mE(p,s) and Artwork Type as the between-painting factor, the Artwork 
TypeExpertise interaction terms reached significance throughout (see Table 3 and Fig. 6). 
The main effect of Expertise was only significant for SD2 and SD4, viz. Es tended to 
describe paintings as more Beautiful and more Informative than NEs, displacing the combined 
distribution below the diagonals of those panels, but this was not a general effect. 
There were also main effects of Artwork Type for SD2, SD3, SD4 and SD6. The 
combined subjects rated R paintings as more Beautiful, Pleasing, Informative, and 
Sophisticated than A paintings, separating the ellipses along the diagonal. (See also Fig. S3.) 
Finally, the distributions of A paintings are more diagonally elongated than their R 
counterparts. That is, Es and NEs both saw greater diversity among A than among R paintings 
in their contents of Interest and Sophistication in particular, but also of Beauty, Pleasingness, 
and Informativeness. (With only NE subjects, Schepman, Rodway, Pullen, & Kirkham, 2015 
also observed a narrower range of responses to R stimuli.) The exception here is SD5 (the 
affective CoolWarm scale), where both ellipses are elongated diagonally, with similar 
response ranges for both A and R artworks. 
The difference in diversity across the six SDs is combined with a tendency for ellipses 
to be tilted at an angle above 45°, rotated towards the vertical. This is most notable in the A 
distributions on SD1, SD2, SD6, where mean ratings mNE(p,s) from NEs varied more – ranging 
down into the Boring, Ugly and Naïve ends of these scales – relative to the corresponding 
means mE(p,s) across Es. Similar steep angles are apparent for the ellipses and distributions of 
R paintings for SD4, SD2 and SD3: that is, the NEs’ mean ratings for these paintings varied 
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more than from Es, ranging further into the Informative, Beautiful and Pleasing ends of those 
scales. 
------------------------------------ 
Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------ 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In general, then, the NE ratings (y-axes) tend to separate R from A paintings more 
clearly than Es (x-axes), as if Es appraise both artwork types by a similar standard. As corollary, 
when both painting types are combined, NEs tend to spread their appraisals across a wider 
range than Es: for most SD scales, an ellipse around all 24 paintings is steeper than 45°. 
 
3.4 Summary 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, about the totality of E and NE response patterns, were affirmed in 
qualitative terms by our interpretation of Figs. 4 and 5. Hypothesis 3 was addressed 
qualitatively, though implicitly, by the ANOVA interaction effects (Tables 2 and 3). We also 
performed direct t-tests. Hypothesis 3 involved E and NE responses to A paintings in isolation, 
then NE responses, in isolation, to A and R paintings. In terms of the panels of Fig. 4, it predicts 
that the distribution of E respondents will be displaced rightward from their NE counterparts; 
and that the NE distribution will be displaced above the diagonal. Indeed, E scores on mA(s) 
were significantly higher than NE scores for SD2 UglyBeautiful (p = .036) and SD4 
UninformativeInformative (p = .005). NE scores on mR(s) were higher than mA(s) equivalents 
(p < .001 for all scales except p = .004 for SD1: repeated-measures). 
 
 
4. Discussion 
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Stimuli were chosen to exemplify two rival modes or types of painting, Abstract vs. 
Representational. In addition, subjects varied in their degree of familiarity with artistic 
practice, and were categorized as Expert or Non-expert. Although both polar oppositions 
simplify a more complex situation, both pairs of groups proved to be valid, despite considerable 
overlap between the artwork types and between the subject groups. 
An initial exploratory phase of Factor Analysis  in “subject mode” channeled the 
variance among subjects into their loadings on two factors. Factor-rotated versions of these 
factors were treated as rival “observer prototypes” for second-order analysis, separately for 
Experts and Non-experts (cf. Bimler, 2013). A second FA  in “artwork mode”  focused on 
the variance among the stimuli, channeling it into their loadings on a different set of factors. 
We had anticipated that at least three factors would be necessary to summarize the 
subjects’ responses on the six SD scales: versions, perhaps, of Hedonic Tone, 
Uncertainty/Complexity, and Arousal identified by Berlyne (1975). In practice, the collective 
descriptions that emerged from data analysis were unexpectedly simple. Only two factors could 
be justified, despite the evidence from comparisons among the panels of Figs. 4 and 5 that no 
two scales captured precisely the same information. In particular, despite the 
favorable/unfavorable connotations of many of the SD scales, there was no indication of a 
‘hedonic’ quality of personal approval/enjoyment, dissociated from aesthetic appraisal. 
It may be that personal preferences did influence the scale ratings, but were too variable 
across subjects to create a distinct factor. More generally, if some subjects attended to fine 
shades of meaning among the scales and used them to discriminate separate aspects of the 
stimuli, they did not do so systematically enough for the distinctions for find their way into the 
pattern of correlations and emerge from the data. This remained true when the Expert students 
were analyzed in isolation: their artistic training did not prompt them to single out additional 
aesthetic-appraisal attributes. 
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This may also be a consequence of the laboratory setting; subjects might have paid 
more attention to nuances among the scales in a naturalistic art-gallery encounter. (E.g. Brieber, 
Nadal, and Leder (2015) noted large differences between laboratory and museum ratings on 
‘Interest’, ‘Understanding’, etc.) One might say that the art status of the 24 paintings used in 
this study was irrelevant; primarily they were visual stimuli, decontextualized and presented as 
computer-monitor reproductions, for aesthetic appraisal in the mundane setting of course-work. 
This is a far cry from art encounters in the valorized settings of galleries and museums. With 
immersion in the artworks unlikely to arouse powerful psychological mechanisms, complex 
models of latent personality variables (such as those considered by Pelowski et al., 2016, 2017) 
are not required. 
Art and Psychology students differed in several respects, validating the labels “Experts” 
and “Non-experts” that amplify the comparative difference between the groups. NEs’ responses 
were more ‘one-dimensional’, dominated by the AbstractRepresentational distinction 
(increasing the VAF of the corresponding principal component), separating them by applying 
different criteria to the two artwork types (Fig. 2, Fig. S2 bottom). In contrast, Es’ artwork 
appraisal features an appreciation of each painting’s color palette and its global vibrancy-vs.-
dullness (Fig. 2, Fig. S2 top). Mean Es’ responses rated Abstract and Representational art on 
similar terms, and often fitted one or both types into narrower ranges of the scales (Fig. S3, 
Table 3). Es’ judgments were more ordered and less dependent on the specific features of each 
painting, in a sense more coherent. 
The ratings on the scales, averaged across stimuli for each observer (Fig. 4) and across 
observers for each stimulus (Fig. 5), suggest that Experts attend more to the formal aspects of 
the stimuli, whether Representational or Abstract, hence the higher salience for them of the 
vertical axis in Fig. 2. As corollaries, the distinction or gradient between the two extremes of 
painting type (the horizontal axis of Fig. 2) did not dominate their responses as it did for Non-
Experts, and their ordering of artworks along that gradient is more nuanced. These findings 
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confirm our Hypothesis 1, i.e. the art-training-dependent development of cognitive mastery 
manifested as cognitive schemata, differing qualitatively in art experts and in laypersons. 
At the level of individual responses and individual loadings on the principal 
components however, despite the even-handedness of their appraisal of Abstract vs. 
Representational art, Experts varied more among themselves than lay observers, confirming 
our Hypothesis 2. This outcome is in accord with the notion of “idiosyncratic experts” (Leder 
et al., 2012) whereby arts training leads to divergence in the use of judgment criteria: the 
“additional frames of reference” and “multiple schemata” characteristic of experts need not be 
the same across experts. 
The distributions of Non-experts’ points in Fig. 4 are systematically displaced above 
the diagonals by the salience for them of the Representational/Abstract distinction (interaction 
effects, Table 2). This is also manifested in the displacement of A ellipses below the diagonal 
in the panels of Fig. 5, and in the tilting of the A and R ellipses. The implication is that the Art 
students viewed the Abstract paintings as more Interesting, Informative, Sophisticated etc. by 
employing appropriate cognitive schemata, compared to laypersons, in line with our 
Hypothesis 3. 
In the general context as summarized in the Introduction, expertise or “cognitive 
mastery” is viewed as the possession of a repertoire of representational schemata and 
frameworks, in which the expert can assimilate novel stimuli, resolving ambiguity and 
encoding them in terms of hidden structural simplicity rather than surface complexity. The 
expertise/type interactions found here support this idea. 
Muth et al. (2015, p. 206) quantified the appeal of ambiguity, but took issue with “the 
frequently reported idea that processing (modern) art simply equals a kind of problem-solving 
task”. They link the aesthetic rewards of an art object not with the solution of its visual puzzle, 
but rather with the number of insights it provides: a resolution of its ambiguities is not crucial. 
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-In this formulation, expertise enhances artwork appreciation by providing viewpoints from 
which these insights are visible. 
We envisage this application of cognitive schemata as an iterative process. In the 
ambiguity / insight paradigm, each solution of a perceptual puzzle or acquisition of an insight 
leads to reassessment, unpacking the visual meaning of the artwork in an open loop: The 
explicit classification stage of encoding is followed by cognitive evaluations, in a dynamic 
process of testing perceptual hypotheses in feedback loops (Augustin et al., 2008; Bachmann 
& Vipper, 1983; Belke et al., 2006; Nodine et al., 1993). 
In this interpretation, aesthetic appraisal is a dynamic process of microgenesis, in which 
a series of perceptual hypotheses unfold and are tested against the artwork “evidence”, 
conceivably at the stage of ‘explicit classification’ (Pelowski et al., 2017). The process is an 
interaction between bottom-up and top-down phenomena, structured in a temporal sequence: 
an initial sensory-based gist reaction (representational aspects; content appraisal) is followed 
by a scrutiny of pictorial features (style appraisal) (Augustin, Leder, Hutzler, & Carbon, 2008; 
Locher, Krupinski, Mello-Thoms, & Nodine, 2007). Initially tentative, diffuse, unstable, 
emotion-arousing percepts evolve in the direction of redundancy gain, becoming more stable, 
regular, differentiated and comprehensible (Bachmann & Vipper, 1983; Cupchik & Berlyne, 
1979). 
Compared to laypersons, perceptogenesis in art experts appears to be a more elaborated 
multiple-loop process, incorporating knowledge of collative (formal) properties of an artwork, 
scrutiny of structural relationships among pictorial elements, and interpretation (Nodine et al., 
1993). The whole process may be accompanied by emotional detachment (cf. Leder et al., 
2004), or by “knowledge emotions” of interest or confusion (Silvia, 2006, 2013). 
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Table 1. Paintings used as stimuli. 
Representational Abstract 
Artist Title. Year Artist Title. Year 
Bellow Dempsy and Firpo. 
1924 
Braque Bottle and fishes. 
1910-1912 
Clausen A frosty March 
morning. 1904 
Delaunay Champs de Mars: La 
Tour Rouge. 1911-1923 
Dix Metropolis. 
1928 
Dove Cow. 
1914 
Friesz Roofs and cathedral in 
Rouen. 1908 
Jawlensky Meditation. (The 
prayer). 1922 
Gauguin The ford. 
1901 
Klee Senecio. 
1922 
Hopper Railroad sunset. 
1929 
Leger The railway crossing. 
1919 
Lempicka Portrait of Miss Allan 
Bott. 1930 
Marc Fighting forms. 
1914. 
Magritte The portrait. 
1935 
Matisse (1) Le rideau jaune. 
1915 
Matisse (2) Dishes and fruit. 
1901 
Metzinger Danseuse au café. 
1912 
Petrov-Vodkin Portrait of Anna 
Akhmatova. 1922 
Picabia Tarantelle. 
1912 
Roerich Lord of the Night. 
1918 
Picasso Bowl of fruit, violin and 
bottle. 1914 
van Dongen The violin player. 
1920 
Villon Girl at the piano. 
1912 
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Table 2. Outcomes of the 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA for six SD scales, with mean descriptions per 
subject across Representational vs. Abstract stimuli [Artwork Type], mR(i,s) and mA(i,s), 
comparing Experts and Non-experts [Expertise]; df=(1, 61) throughout. No main effects of 
Expertise reached significance. * = Marginally significant. 
 
Semantic differential scale 
Artwork Type 
main effect 
Artwork TypeExpertise 
interaction effect 
 F p hp
2  F p hp
2  
SD1 BoringInteresting 3.51 0.066* 0.054 6.50 0.013 0.096 
SD2 UglyBeautiful 28.28 < 0.001 0.317 3.73 0.058* 0.058 
SD3 AnnoyingPleasing 24.56 < 0.001 0.287 4.01 0.050 0.062 
SD4 UninformativeInformative 77.24 < 0.001 0.559 12.97 0.001 0.175 
SD5 CoolWarm 31.80 < 0.001 0.343 4.09 0.048 0.063 
SD6 NaïveSophisticated 26.14 < 0.001 0.300 4.27 0.043 0.065 
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Table 3. Outcomes of the 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA for six SD scales, with mean descriptions per painting from Experts and Non-experts [Expertise]), 
mE(p,s) and mNE(p,s), comparing Abstract vs. Representational [Artwork Type]; df=(1, 23) throughout. Only significant effects shown. 
 
Semantic differential scale 
Expertise 
main effect 
Artwork Type 
main effect 
Artwork TypeExpertise 
interaction effect 
 F p hp
2  F p hp
2  F p hp
2  
SD1 BoringInteresting       9.16 0.006 0.294 
SD2 UglyBeautiful 9.10 0.006 0.293 5.51 0.028 0.200 6.07 0.022 0.216 
SD3 AnnoyingPleasing    6.55 0.018 0.229 6.59 0.018 0.230 
SD4 UninformativeInformative 6.83 0.016 0.237 19.84 < 0.001 0.474 18.12 < 0.001 0.452 
SD5 CoolWarm       4.31 0.050 0.164 
SD6 NaïveSophisticated    6.68 0.017 0.233 5.58 0.027 0.202 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. Loadings for 63 observers on the first two components of unrotated subject-mode 
PCA solution with painting-scale combinations as rows (PC1 = “Consensus”, PC2 = 
“Distinction”). Points colored to distinguish Experts (Art students;) and Non-experts 
(Psychology students; ). 
 
Figure 2. Scores for 24 paintings in second-order PCA of “Consensus” components from 
separate PCA of Expert-only and Non-expert-only data (PC1(E), PC1(NE)). Lines link the two 
points representing each painting, for E and NE appraisal; artist’s name identifies the NE 
version. Points colored to distinguish R () and A () paintings. 
 
Figure 3. Loadings for 24 paintings on the first two components of rotated artwork-mode PCA 
solution with subject-scale combinations as rows (PC1 = “Representational”, PC2 = 
“Abstract”). PC3 (“Color”) is orthogonal. Points colored to distinguish R () and A () 
paintings. 
 
Figure 4. Scatter-plots of mean scores per subject on each of six SD scales, averaged across 
Abstract vs. Representational stimuli, mA(i,s) and mR(i,s) (horizontal and vertical axes). Points 
colored to distinguish E () and NE subjects (), with ellipses enclosing separate distributions. 
 
Figure 5. Scatter-plots of mean scores per painting on each of six SD scales, averaged across 
Experts vs. Non-Experts, mE(p,s) and mNE(p,s) (horizontal and vertical axes). Points colored 
to distinguish R () and A () paintings, with ellipses enclosing separate distributions. 
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Figure 6. Mean scores on six SD scales within Artwork Type and art Expertise, showing 
interaction. Error bars show standard errors. 
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Supplementary Material 
Figure S1. Scores for 24 paintings in second-order PCA of the “Consensus” component 
(PC1(C)) from unrotated subject-mode PCA of combined Expert and Non-expert data. 
 Representational paintings;  Abstract paintings. 
Figure S2. Scores for 24 paintings in second-order PCA of Expert (top) and Non-expert 
(bottom) exaggerated, prototype components from unrotated subject-mode PCA of 
combined data. Identification of components only tentative.  Representational 
paintings;  Abstract paintings. 
Figure S3. Bar graphs showing mean scores for each painting on six SD scales, separately 
across Experts (Art students; ■) and Non-experts (Psychology students; ■). Paintings 
arranged in order of ascending means, separately for Representational and Abstract 
artworks. Error bars show 95% CIs. 
